SURVEY OF SECURITY VULNERABILITIES IN SESSION INITIATION PROTOCOL

Survey of security vulnerabilities in session initiation protocol," in IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 68-81, 3rd. Qtr. 2006
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Outline

- VoIP security issue
- SIP security
- Media security
- Solution

VoIP security issue

- VoIP is based on an open environment
- VoIP inherit vulnerabilities from underlying transport protocols
  - TCP, IP, UDP
- PSTN rely on closed network

VoIP security issue

- Some security mechanisms have been proposed for SIP-based infrastructures, but vulnerabilities still exist
- Exhaust available resources
- Create false responses upon to the reception of malicious requests
- Discover vulnerabilities in the applications

SIP security (DoS)

- Denial of Service (DoS), interruption/destruction of service provisioning
- Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), use multiple computers to paralyze the target system
  - flood target’s bandwidth
  - consume target’s resources

SIP security (DDoS)

- Flooding Registrar Server
- Attacker launches an attack against a REGISTRAR by employing lots of **registration requests**
  - Guess legitimate users' passwords
  - Cause a DoS in the SIP registrar

SIP security (DDoS)

- Flooding Proxy Server and End-User Terminal
- Attacker launches several **SIP INVITE**
  - SIP proxy must keep the connection state until redirect transaction has been replied
  - Parazyle proxy server & end user



Figure 6. *Flood with INVITE messages.*

SIP security (Parser Attack)

- SIP is a text-based protocol, so an efficient parser is important
- Some message headers are vital for processing (e.g. To, Via, etc.)



Figure 8. *Multiple header possibilities.*

SIP security (Application Attack)

- BYE/CANCEL Attack
- Attacker needs to learn all necessary session parameters
- Session-ID, RTP Port, etc.



Figure 9. *Normal session termination.*



Figure 10. *BYE attack.*



Figure 11. *CANCEL request.*



Figure 12. *CANCEL attack.*

SIP security (Application Attack)

- Re-INVITE/UPDATE Attack
- Modify the parameters of the dialog-session



Figure 13. *"Re-INVITE" attack.*



Figure 14. *UPDATE attack.*

SIP security (Application Attack)

- REFER Attack
- MITM(Man In The Middle) attacks



SIP security (Application Attack)

- SQL Injection Attack
- SIP relies on databases such as MySQL, Postgress, etc. to store administer user credentials and appropriate data (e.g. user name, password)
- The utilization of WEB interfaces for the provision of SIP services makes this attack more attractive

Media security

- RTP doesn’t provide any mechanisms for eavesdropping(竊聽) or other attacks. (Not encrypted)

Solution (Enctrption)

- Prevent eavesdropping
- IPsec (Internet Protocol Security)
- TLS (Transport Layer Secure)
- S/MIME (Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions)
- SRTP (Secure RTP)
    - SRTP encrypts only payload of a voice packet without adding additional encryption headers

Solution (AAA)

- Authentication
  - Identifying a user
- Authorization
  - Determining user privilege
- Accounting
  - Monitors/Control the resources a user consumes

Solution (SIP Parser, SQL)

- Server Application Side
  - Check if the input is malicious
- Database Side
  - Only one SQL statement can be executed during one system call
  - Restrict user permissions

Solution (Flooding)

- None of the underlying security mechanisms to prevent SIP flooding
- Ban malicious users

Thank you for your listening!